Thursday, April 26, 2007

Some Interesting Biblical Cross-Referencing

From the sixth hour until the ninth hour darkness came over all the land. About the ninth hour Jesus cried out in a loud voice, "Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani?"—which means, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?"
--Matthew 27:45-46


1 My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?
Why are you so far from saving me,
so far from the words of my groaning?

2 O my God, I cry out by day, but you do not answer,
by night, and am not silent.

3 Yet you are enthroned as the Holy One;
you are the praise of Israel.

4 In you our fathers put their trust;
they trusted and you delivered them.

5 They cried to you and were saved;
in you they trusted and were not disappointed.

6 But I am a worm and not a man,
scorned by men and despised by the people.

7 All who see me mock me;
they hurl insults, shaking their heads:

8 "He trusts in the LORD;
let the LORD rescue him.
Let him deliver him,
since he delights in him."

9 Yet you brought me out of the womb;
you made me trust in you
even at my mother's breast.

10 From birth I was cast upon you;
from my mother's womb you have been my God.

11 Do not be far from me,
for trouble is near
and there is no one to help.

12 Many bulls surround me;
strong bulls of Bashan encircle me.

13 Roaring lions tearing their prey
open their mouths wide against me.

14 I am poured out like water,
and all my bones are out of joint.
My heart has turned to wax;
it has melted away within me.

15 My strength is dried up like a potsherd,
and my tongue sticks to the roof of my mouth;
you lay me in the dust of death.

16 Dogs have surrounded me;
a band of evil men has encircled me,
they have pierced my hands and my feet.

17 I can count all my bones;
people stare and gloat over me.

18 They divide my garments among them
and cast lots for my clothing.

19 But you, O LORD, be not far off;
O my Strength, come quickly to help me.

20 Deliver my life from the sword,
my precious life from the power of the dogs.

21 Rescue me from the mouth of the lions;
save me from the horns of the wild oxen.

22 I will declare your name to my brothers;
in the congregation I will praise you.

23 You who fear the LORD, praise him!
All you descendants of Jacob, honor him!
Revere him, all you descendants of Israel!

24 For he has not despised or disdained
the suffering of the afflicted one;
he has not hidden his face from him
but has listened to his cry for help.

25 From you comes the theme of my praise in the great assembly;
before those who fear you will I fulfill my vows.

26 The poor will eat and be satisfied;
they who seek the LORD will praise him—
may your hearts live forever!

27 All the ends of the earth
will remember and turn to the LORD,
and all the families of the nations
will bow down before him,

28 for dominion belongs to the LORD
and he rules over the nations.

29 All the rich of the earth will feast and worship;
all who go down to the dust will kneel before him—
those who cannot keep themselves alive.

30 Posterity will serve him;
future generations will be told about the Lord.

31 They will proclaim his righteousness
to a people yet unborn—
for he has done it.

--Psalm 22


Later, knowing that all was now completed, and so that the Scripture would be fulfilled, Jesus said, "I am thirsty." A jar of wine vinegar was there, so they soaked a sponge in it, put the sponge on a stalk of the hyssop plant, and lifted it to Jesus' lips. When he had received the drink, Jesus said, "It is finished." With that, he bowed his head and gave up his spirit.

John 19:28-30

Saturday, April 14, 2007

Created Meaning

Suppose I woke up one afternoon in a Macy's department store and I had no idea how I got there. After rubbing my face, visiting the restroom, and checking men's slacks just in case they actually have anything in my size, I'm sure I'd begin to ask questions like "Why am I here?", "How did I get here?", and "Did someone put me here, and, if so, then for what purpose?". I was having a hard time answering these questions on my own, but an elderly sales associate told me that I was placed there by Macy himself so that I might begin a lifelong career in retail. Of source, I rejected the associate's explanation; for all I knew, it might have been a self-serving lie on her part, and I had no direct evidence that such a person as Macy existed, much less that this putative Macy cared anything about my career. I was not wearing clothes suitable for an interview, and I woke up at the opposite end of the store from the service desk where the job applications were kept. If I was meant to get a job there, I had no special indication this was so.

My appearance in the department store may have a meaning: Perhaps Macy did indeed bring me there (kidnapper!) to get a job. Perhaps it is a prank my friends are playing on me. Perhaps it is a sign from God that I should not get wasted then go wandering around town, passing out in random locations.

My appearance in the department store may not have a meaning: Perhaps I merely suffered from simultaneous attacks of narcolepsy and somnambulism. Perhaps I got wasted and went wandering around town, but God wasn't trying to show me anything from it. Perhaps, because of some unanticipated consequence of quantum physics, I teleported into that Macy's store while taking an afternoon nap.

What if, I tried to create a meaning for the situation I was in? I don't know why I would want to do this, since I'd much rather know the actual meaning of my appearance in Macy's, if there is one; but suppose I did. If we take the phrase "create a meaning" literally, then it is simply absurd. I cannot create a meaning for my appearance in Macy's. I may discover it, I may imagine it or pretend it, but I can't create meaning after the fact, simply because I cannot change the past nor intentionally cause something that I did not intentionally cause. Is this what existentialists mean when they talk of creating meaning?

Of course, existentialists are smarter than that. But then, what does it mean to create meaning? I suppose if I appeared in Macy's without intending to be there, I could let the visit serve some purpose. I couldn't properly say "I'm here because I need to buy a new belt", but I could say "Since I'm here, I might as well buy a new belt." This makes perfect sense. The thing is, it seems to me that none of the existentialists are as bland as that. Nietzche could have saved a lot of paper if he merely said "Life is meaningless, but, since we're here, we might as well do what we like and not let any old customs or religious dogmas get in our way", but he didn't. Maybe I've just answered my own question. If life is meaningless and we might as well do as we like, then thinking people might as well do the absurd and create meaning, just because they like doing it.

Sunday, January 14, 2007

Past Events and Probability

I once read an article that tried to invalidate a favorite premise of people who argue in favor of Intelligent Design, specifically the extreme improbability of life spontaneously arising from non-life. The article started with the assertion that the probability of any past event is necessarily 1, therefore Intelligent Design partisans were committing a dark and dangerous fallacy by insisting that of life existence of life was highly improbable if it arose through purely natural means. I won't deny that Intelligent Design partisans can and do commit dark and dangerous fallacies, but I don't think that believing the stated premise is one of them. Instead, I doubt the validity of the notion that we should always consider the probability of a known past event to be 1 when reasoning about past events. I do so because such an assumption to deduce some apparently false conclusions. Since we should not be able to deduce false conclusions from any true premise, we should not make it a rule that the probability of any known past event is 1, modus tollens.

Here goes my argument. Let's call the assertion under dispute "Proposition 1" and state it as follows:
  1. If an event occurred in the past, then the probability that the event occurred is 1.
At first glance, this seems reasonable, even intuitively true. It seems internally consistent, and can I think of a way to derive a contradiction from it (not that I've thought that much about it). But that's not what I'm arguing.

Now for Propositions 2 and 3:
  1. 1 is greater than 1/2
  2. If an event has a probability of 1, then the probability that the event occurred is greater than 1/2.
Proposition 2 should be axiomatic enough for anyone, and Proposition 3 is just an instance of Proposition 2. Sorry to bore you with such triviality, but I need Proposition 3 so I can use it in a Hypothetical Syllogism with Proposition 1 to infer Proposition 4:
  1. If an event occurred in the past, then the probability that the event occurred is greater than 1/2.
To state it more simply, if it happened, then it probably happened. This does not seem to pose a problem; if George Washington crossed the Delaware, then we wouldn't be amiss to say that George Washington probably crossed the Delaware, right?

Things only become interesting when we consider a particular case of the contrapositive of Proposition 4:
  1. If the probability of a past event occurring is less than or equal to 1/2, then the event did not occur.
  2. If the probability of a past event occurring is less than 1/2, then the event did not occur.
(Proposition 6 is just Proposition 5 limited to the particular case where the probability of the event is not equal to 1/2). Proposition 6 is my basis for rejecting Proposition 1. To state it simply, if something probably didn't happen, then it didn't happen, or, in other words, improbable events never occur. In a sense, this is believable. If something happened, then it can't not have happened, right? Maybe so. I can't disprove the law of cause and effect. But I can say that trouble ensues when we try to apply Proposition 6 to a situation where something "probably would have" or "probably shouldn't have" happened.

Take an example: Let's say I find out that my brother the college student failed an exam. I know he's a smart guy, and the class he failed it for wasn't anything difficult like thermodynamics, and most of the professors at the college he goes to are competent teachers and test writers. Therefore, he probably didn't study for the test. If I accept Proposition 6, then I must conclude that he simply did not study for the test.

Here is the problem: I should not be able to draw this conclusion based on the information I have. It is still possible that he did study, but he got a bad professor or he just wasn't understanding the material or perhaps something else. However, Proposition 6 follows necessarily from Proposition 1, Proposition 1 makes this conclusion not only possible, but logically necessary!

Therefore, it would be an obvious fallacy to apply Proposition 1 to reasoning about the probabilities of past events. I am not saying that I've reduced Proposition 1 to absurdity. I'm just saying that it is not a valid rule to be used for reasoning about the probability of past events, which is exactly what was attempted in the aforementioned article regarding intelligent design.

Sunday, December 17, 2006

Concept and Reality

Can God create a rock so big he cannot move it? The easy answer would be "yes he can, but if he is omnipotent, he evidently has not yet chosen to do so." But seriously, what if we find some inconsistency in our notion of God? Are we then obliged to conclude by the law of non-contradiction that God does not exist? I say no, if we are clever enough to distinguish between concept and reality.

Such an obligation would depend on a certain proposition, here stated in logicky terms:

For all real entities x, if our concept of x is not logically consistent, then x does not exist.

Important to my argument is the distinction between a real entity and our concept of it. These two things are what St. Anselm would have called "a thing in reality" and "a thing in the mind", respectively. Though in order to think about some object, say a rock, we must have some concept of what that rock is, the rock and our concept are distinct; one is "out there" and the other is in our brain. Of the two, only the thing in our brain can properly be said to be logically consistent or logically absurd. Only propositions can contradict and a rock is not a proposition.

With this understood, I can provide an easy couterexample to the above-mentioned rule: Let us pretend that we have two theories of physics known to us and call them Q and R. Let us pretend that each theory, on its own, is an amazingly accurate and poweful explanation of a great deal of physical phenomena, and the two together account for pretty much everything we know for sure about the physical world. Let us pretend that not a few successful technologies have been developed based on these theories. But then, let us further pretend that these two theories are logically inconsistent with each other, that is to say, if we combine the two, we end up with some contradictions. What then would we do? We might do like Hegelians and find in Q a thesis, then find in R its antithesis, then try to find their synthesis in some theory S. Failing that, we might just choose to live uncomfortably with Q and R's inconsistency; we might resign ourselves to the idea that physical objects are not perfectly comprehensible. But at no point would we doubt the existence of physical objects; we've run into them too many times in our own experience to do that.

Therefore, since we would not allow such a situation to disprove a known reality, we cannot honestly say we affirm the proposition stated above on pain of inconsistency. We could modify it to say:

For all real entities x, if we are not sure x exists and our concept of x is not logically consistent, then x does not exist.

But this modification is not reasonable. By the definition of "real entitiy", the existence of a real entity does not depend on our knowledge of its existence. Therefore, we cannot use this rule to disprove the existence of some external reality, even if we doubt that entity's existence.

Like any other external reality, so it is with God. When a traditional Christian says they believe in God, they mean that the object of their faith is an external reality and not a concept, though of necessity they must have some concept of what God is. If she runs into contradictions when contemplating God, she does not need to become an atheist. She might just choose to consider the highly probable possibility that her understanding of God is not perfect.

Friday, November 10, 2006

Deserving Heaven

Getting to spend eternity in Paradise for a lifetime of good deeds is like getting paid $10,000 to mow a lawn. Whatever it is, it isn't deserved.

Sunday, October 15, 2006

The Pagan Urge

While on a trip to Ghana with the Gospel Choir, Professor Jelks said something which was memorable to me. He said to some of us in the group (and I paraphrase to you), 'I woke up this morning and stepped outside my room and saw the sun and I felt like worshipping it. Then I thought to myself, "Hey, I'm a Christian, I don't worship the sun!"'.

In spite of my stodgy Christian self, which tenses whenever it senses anything theologically liberal, I sympathized with him. The sun really is something wonderful, when you think of it. This was especially clear in Ghana, where it shines through the harmattan haze gloriously onto forests, fields and jungles, and rises and sets each day at nearly the same time year-round. I totally agreed and still do agree, that the sun does and should inspire worship. After hearing that observation from a regular person, I started to understand why so many pagan religions worship the sun - and so many other parts of nature, for that matter. I "feel them", in the current idiomatic sense of the phrase. It's not just about the practical benefits the sun brings, or its apparent power, but about an ineffable feeling it and other parts of nature inspire.

It did not take much thought for me to realize that this feeling did not threaten, but rather vindicated Christianity; because Christianity vindicated the feeling. If, in response to these urges, we worship the sun; if we dance it front of it and pray to it and make offerings to it, we express our feelings. But our feelings are absurd when we take into account the fact that the sun is a perpetually exploding ball of gas which is not aware of anything, including our love and adoration for it. Pagan worship makes sense inasmuch as it is a natural response to our feelings. It does not make sense inasmuch as it is an attempt to communicate appreciation to something that does not perceive appreciation. My Christian theism had this problem solved even before I posed it. It only took a moment to realize that I can act out these feelings for the sun by worshipping the God that created it. The same goes for the moon, rivers, trees and every other thing I happen to like. Indeed, I can express this feeling for anything and everything at once by worshipping the creator. God, by definition, desires and appreciates worship. If we sing praises to God, he hears. If we exalt him, he's glad of it. The urge to worship is not only genuine, it's functional. Also, it's efficient. There aren't enough days in the year to have a festival for every aspect of nature that awes us. There aren't enough people to maintain a priesthood for each cult we might create. The Ephesians worshipped Artemis because they only had time and energy for Artemis. Take away their local patriotism and they still would have neglected Zeus and Aphrodite and Ares out of practical necessity. In this respect, a monotheist can accomplish what a polytheist cannot even attempt.